Influenza surveillance studies in humans and animals performed for many years have provided a wealth of data on the ecology and evolution of influenza viruses and their public health related and economical impact. Here we provide a brief overview of some of the data from the past and give our view on how the continued and intensified animal influenza virus surveillance may aid in the early recognition and management of outbreaks in the future. Crown Copyright © 2003 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Influenza virus types A, B and C all belong to the family of Orthomyxoviridae and have therefore many biological properties in common [1] . A key difference between them is their in vivo host-range; whereas influenza viruses of types B and C are predominantly human pathogens that have also been isolated from seals and pigs, respectively [2, 3] , influenza A viruses have been isolated from many species including humans, pigs, horses, marine mammals and a wide range of domestic and wild birds [4] . It is generally accepted that in the human influenza pandemics from the last centuries and numerous outbreaks in domestic and wild animals, interspecies transmission of avian influenza viruses have played a crucial role.
Influenza in wild animals
Wild birds, predominantly ducks, geese and gulls form the reservoir of influenza A viruses in nature (Fig. 1 ). All 15 antigenic subtypes of the virus surface glycoprotein hemagglutinin and all 9 subtypes of neuraminidase that have been identified to date have been isolated from these bird species [4] . Avian influenza viruses preferentially infect cells lining the intestinal tract of birds and are excreted in high concentrations in their faeces. The transmission of influenza viruses between birds is thought to occur primarily via a faecal-oral route. In the northern hemisphere, the prevalence of avian influenza is at its peak between late summer and early winter when the birds leave their breeding grounds and start migrating and up to 30% of a flock or colony may be excreting virus (Fouchier et al., unpublished). Whereas avian influenza viruses are generally non-pathogenic in their natural hosts, they may cause significant morbidity and mortality upon transmission to other species.
Influenza in domestic animals
Although a diversity of animal species have been shown to be susceptible to influenza A virus infections, three groups of animals other than humans appear to be more important in the epidemiology of influenza than others, namely: birds, pigs and horses. The disease caused by influenza viruses in pigs is essentially similar to that recorded in humans, with low mortality but high morbidity [5] and has serious economic consequences due to the increased time needed to attain slaughter weight. Swine influenza is related to the movement of animals from infected to susceptible herds, clinical disease generally appears with the introduction of new pigs. Pigs are susceptible to infection with influenza A viruses from both avian and human hosts with occasional transmission of virus to humans. The virus rarely spreads subsequently from human to human but can be fatal in association with other factors [6] .
In domestic birds, the clinical signs and disease observed following infection with influenza A viruses vary according to the host species, age, the presence of other micro-organisms and environmental factors. In susceptible avian species, uncomplicated infections can be divided into two forms based on the severity of the clinical disease produced. The most virulent viruses cause a disease formerly known as fowl plague and now termed highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), in which mortality may be as high as 100%. These viruses have been restricted to subtypes H5 and H7, although not all viruses of these subtypes cause HPAI. Nineteen primary isolates of such viruses have been reported in domestic poultry since 1959. Infections of poultry with HPAI are often self-limiting or rapidly controlled by slaughter. However, on four occasions in recent years, in Pennsylvania, USA, from 1983 to 1984 [7] , in Mexico from 1994 to 1995 [8, 9] , Pakistan from 1994 to 1995 [10] and in Italy from 1999 to 2000 [11] the viruses have become widespread in poultry and have had severe implications for animal health and the economy of the country or region involved. The impact of these outbreaks is best measured in losses of birds and financial terms. For example, in the epidemic in Italy more than 14 million birds were slaughtered or died and it is estimated that the direct costs of compensation were 100 million euros with a further 400 million euros borne by the farmers and allied industries (Capua, personal communication) .
All other viruses cause a much milder disease consisting primarily of respiratory disease, depression and egg production problems in laying birds. In addition, these non-or less pathogenic avian influenza viruses may replicate in the epithelial cells of the intestine of birds without inducing signs of disease [12] , although virus may be shed in high concentrations in the faeces [12] [13] [14] . Viruses of low pathogenicity may become widespread in a given area, incurring substantial economic losses. During 1995, 178 turkey farms in Minnesota, USA, were affected by influenza A virus of H9N2, resulting in the worst economic loss due to influenza infections recorded in a single year in Minnesota (approximately US$ 6 million) [15] whilst in 2002, millions of birds were slaughtered in Virginia and North Carolina, USA, following rapid spread of H7N2 viruses believed to have originated from live bird markets. Infections in poultry are acquired from wild birds and are usually spread by movement of stock or infective faeces via the agency of humans.
Equine influenza is a clinical disease of horses, donkeys and mules that is common throughout the world and is caused by influenza A viruses of subtypes H7N7 and H3N8. Subtype H7N7 viruses may have disappeared from the horse population, as no substantiated reports of virus isolated from horses have been recorded since 1980 [16] . The disease in fully susceptible animals is similar to that seen in pigs and humans, presenting as a severe respiratory infection. When equine influenza has been introduced into susceptible populations, sometimes directly from avian hosts [17] , characteristic rapid spread and high morbidity have occurred.
Transmission of animal influenza viruses to humans
For many years, it was thought that for the efficient introduction of "novel" influenza viruses to humans, pigs were required to act as an intermediate host, or "mixing vessel". Since pigs are susceptible to both human and avian influenza viruses, the genomes of such viruses could reassort and/or adapt to this mammalian host, giving rise to new viruses with altered phenotypes that could more easily be transmitted to humans. Indeed, the pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were both caused by reassortant influenza viruses that may have been generated in pigs (Fig. 2) . Moreover, several incidents of transmission of influenza viruses from pigs to humans have been described in the past decades [18, 19] . However, since 1996, the viruses H7N7, H5N1 and H9N2 have been transmitted directly from birds to humans but have apparently failed to spread in the human population [20] [21] [22] [23] . Such incidents are rare but demonstrate the potential of avian viruses to transmit directly to humans. It cannot be excluded that upon dual infection of humans with avian and human influenza A viruses, man himself may act as a "mixing vessel" for the generation of novel human-avian reassortant viruses [24] . 
Animal influenza virus surveillance
Although it will be virtually impossible to prevent new outbreaks of influenza in humans and animals, it is now well recognised that global animal influenza virus surveillance can play a key role in the early recognition of new threats. Insights into the prevalence of influenza A viruses in animals in our environment may provide a clue for which viruses to look out for. In the reference laboratories, the pathogenic and antigenic properties of the circulating viruses can be determined and panels of reference reagents required for testing of animals and humans can be updated when needed. Importantly, the intensified global surveillance of animal influenza may shed new light on questions related to the temporal and spatial variation in circulating influenza viruses and the epidemiology, ecology and evolution of influenza A viruses.
Although excellent human and animal influenza virus surveillance networks are already in place, several changes in and additions to the current surveillance schemes have recently been proposed. The WHO initiated a "global agenda on influenza surveillance and control," a prioritised list of activities to reduce morbidity and mortality from annual influenza epidemics, to prepare for the next influenza pandemic, to coordinate national and international action in influenza surveillance and control and to advocate and raise funds. At the same time, policy makers and authorities from different geographical areas such as the European Union have proposed additional surveillance studies within their avian influenza surveillance network aimed at the control of H5 and H7 influenza viruses, and the use of surveillance studies in wild birds as a potential early warning system. Increasing emphasis is being placed on regions where there is a large interface of human-animal contact particularly in relation to epidemiological data indicative of high levels of influenza activity in animal hosts. This is reflected by intensive animal influenza surveillance in some regions of south east Asia, North America and Europe in part associated and linked with programmes in humans. Authorities now recognise the requirement for the integration of human and animal influenza surveillance networks, integration of disease and virological and serological surveillance studies, and the improved management, utilisation and exchange of data and reagents that will strengthen such surveillance studies.
